As proxy advisors and shareholders continue to focus on improving the relationship between compensation and shareholder returns, and new pay for performance rules are finalized by the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, it is likely that more companies will consider adapting incentives based on Total Shareholder Return (TSR) principles. Ultimately, companies need to balance shareholder value creation with executive motivation and retention when deciding whether a TSR-based incentive plan is appropriate and aligns with the company’s compensation philosophy.
If TSR is utilized in a performance-based award package, companies need to consider the following three factors: whether TSR should be measured on an absolute or relative basis, the appropriate TSR performance hurdle, and whether there will be a cap on payouts based on absolute TSR performance.
1. Absolute versus Relative TSR. Absolute TSR requires the company to set stock price targets that must be achieved to earn a payout. Establishing an absolute stock price level at the beginning of a performance period can be challenging, as a declining stock market could make goal achievement difficult to achieve, while a “buoyant” stock market could make the absolute goal relatively easy to achieve. The challenge with relative TSR is that it requires the company to select a peer group or index that is appropriate for relative TSR performance comparisons. Identifying an appropriate comparator can be particularly challenging for companies in unique markets or industries with just a few competitors.
A well-designed TSR plan might provide that when a company achieves both low absolute TSR and relative TSR, little to no payouts would be allowed (Figure 1, box C); similarly, when absolute TSR and relative TSR performance are high, payouts would be sizable (Figure 1, box B).
In cases of high absolute TSR with low relative performance (Figure 1, box A), some type of reduction in payouts might be appropriate, as the company underperformed the stock market. Similarly, in cases of low absolute TSR and high relative TSR performance (Figure 1, box D), management could be rewarded for out-performing a down stock market.
Competitive practice, however, does not often combine these two concepts. Most plans are based on relative TSR, with no adjustment for absolute performance. The few companies that set absolute stock price (or TSR) goals do not consider relative performance. A few large companies have introduced payout caps when absolute performance is negative, a concept which is discussed below.
2.TSR Performance Hurdle. If absolute TSR is utilized, a company will need to decide a minimum stock price level that must be achieved to trigger a payout (e.g., the current stock price is $15, and a trigger price of $30 is established before a payout can be earned). Determining an absolute stock price, or TSR hurdle, should stretch the executive’s efforts, but should not be demotivating. That said, the performance of the overall stock market or the stock performance of the company’s industry sector can make the $30 target in the example either impossible or easy to achieve, which may not create the intended incentive.
For relative TSR, the company must decide the minimum level of relative performance compared to a peer group or market index that begins to provide a payout. This approach allows companies to avoid the need to set a specific stock price. However, it is important to remember that a relative TSR goal may not provide the intended motivation, as the goal is not as clear cut as the absolute stock price target (and, presumably, the underlying earnings or cash flow that must be achieved to support the target stock price).
A typical relative TSR performance curve for a US-based company is illustrated in Figure 2. The threshold level is often the most debated payout level on the performance curve, although competitive market practice suggests the 25th percentile is the most common threshold performance level. By way of contrast, a UK-based company would typically start payouts at 50thpercentile relative performance.
3. TSR Caps. In order to reward both relative and absolute performance, some companies with relative TSR plans have placed a cap on payouts when absolute TSR is negative. These caps often limit payouts to 100% of target despite the company’s ability to outperform in a down market, as shareholders lost value during the performance period.The obvious issue with this approach is the lack of symmetry. Specifically, if the share price increases significantly, but relative TSR is below the threshold level, no payouts will occur. Thus, shareholders will realize a significant increase in stock value and management does not receive a payout (contrast this result with stock options, where management would realize a significant amount of “intrinsic value”). The lack of symmetry and the general belief that out-performance in a down stock market should be rewarded has likely led companies to refrain from imposing caps on payouts.This may change as shareholders and the proxy advisory firms continue to apply pressure on companies to better align pay and performance. In addition, the SEC proposed rules required under Dodd Frank in July 2015 that when finalized will require disclosure of the relationship of pay and TSR (both relative and absolute). This disclosure could impact the design of incentive plans including TSR-based plans to further align realized compensation with shareholder returns (including the use of TSR caps).
Michael Kesner is principal and Jennifer Kwech is senior manager of Deloitte Consulting LLP’s Compensation Strategies Practice.
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The succession work boards oversee is more complex than it once was. Oversight of the internal talent pipeline has grown beyond a narrow focus on CEO successors to include other internal and external talent. This relatively new role for the board or governance committee demands the hands-on ability to assess upper-management aptitude and readiness for the top job.
On September 21, the NACD Atlanta Chapter invited three exemplary former CEOs who serve on public boards to advise Atlanta-area directors on how to navigate this more demanding process. The panel, moderated by NACD President Peter R. Gleason, was comprised of Richard Anderson, previously CEO of Delta Airlines, and member of the Cargill and Medtronic boards; Martha Brooks, former CEO of Alcan, and director of Bombardier and Jabil Circuit; and Frank Blake, former CEO and chair of Home Depot, and currently a director at Delta Airlines.
For context, CEO turnover within the world’s largest 2,500 companies has increased in recent years, according to a 2016 study by PwC titled 2015 CEO Success that analyzed CEO turnover data from 2015 in the U.S. and around the globe. Among the study’s findings were the following data:
CEO turnover around the globe reached a record rate of 16.6 percent.
In North America, the rate of CEO turnover was 14.3 percent.
Planned turnover accounted for 10.9 percent of all turnover indicated in the study.
Force-outs were reported at 3 percent.
CEO turnover triggered by mergers and acquisitions occurred at a rate of 2.8 percent globally and in the U.S.
Looking specifically at U.S. turnover data, of all CEO turnovers, 4.4 percent were planned and 2.2 percent of the CEOs were forced out.
The traditional tactic when seeking new CEO talent has been to “go inside” for the most qualified internal candidate, but boards are now deliberately bringing in external CEO candidates. When the same PwC study compared statistics from 2004 to 2015, the percentage of outsiders hired as CEO increased from 14 percent in 2004 to 22 percent in 2015—a 50 percent increase in external hires in 10 years.
Hiring an outsider to serve as CEO was once seen as a last resort—something that typically only happened when a board had to force out the incumbent CEO suddenly, had failed to groom a suitable successor, or both. In recent years, however, more companies have chosen an outsider CEO, and frequently as part of a planned succession.
The stakes are higher. The process is more transparent and invites activist investors, pundits, and media to scrutinize a company’s process and its decision. Often the current CEO is left somewhat in the dark about the progress and the remaining leadership team may just not know status, which leads to uncertainty and process dysfunction.
The distinguished panel offered these nine valuable lessons learned about successfully navigating this board responsibility.
Succession must be a CEO-driven process. The panelists urged that a board place the CEO in the middle of the succession process but not as a direct party to the final decision process. They argued that the current CEO brings unique knowledge and passion for the future of the business, and that he or she wants a leadership legacy that includes a smooth and smart transition to a new CEO. The CEO also knows the internal talent pipeline better than any director, which could be an asset to the board. The panel added that with the board’s involvement and perhaps that of external resources, the risk of the “favored son” effect could be mitigated.
Succession is a full-board endeavor. Ownership of the process, knowledge of internal candidate development, insight into what could potentially derail the process, external benchmarking, and strategic issues that await the new CEO are matters for the full board to address. Committees can execute on specific tasks but the work, insight, and decision-making process related to CEO succession must be owned by the full board.
One committee member urged every board member to meet and assess final candidates against a written success and impact profile during lengthy one-on-one interviews. The panel expressed their belief that the successful candidate would develop a sound, unique relationship with each director. Panelists also perceive interviews as the gateway to relationship building and ultimately to the CEO being accepted into the board’s inner circle.
The lead director plays an integral role as mentor. The board’s succession method needs a quality control focal point, or someone who will manage group processes among directors so that the “loudest voices” around the boardroom table are not those that necessarily carry the most weight. The panel suggested that the board could task the lead director with this quality-control leadership.
Remember that the board’s loyalty belongs to the company—not the current CEO or internal candidates. The board needs and values input from the CEO and there may be internal candidates who are highly regarded. But decisions must be based single-mindedly upon duty-of-care philosophies—the company’s future.
Competition among internal candidates must be monitored and managed by the CEO and board. Internal candidates should be explicitly informed or they are likely to figure out whether or not they are a candidate for the CEO role. With that information or suspicion, a competitive “horse race” may begin and performance may peak. There is also the inevitable dysfunction that can occur between the contenders as well as their organizations as they “bid up” their candidacy. CEOs and lead directors may intervene to manage negative behavior, and reinforce that senior-level performance is a collective effort. Compensation schemes for these candidates should be aligned in the spirit that “we all row the boat together.”
Get a written exit report from the outgoing CEO. Have the CEO personally develop a lengthy perspective about the future focus of the business and the CEO’s most critical areas of personal attention. Develop an “issues list” of those matters that the new CEO will likely bump into in the market, inside the company, and with regulators. Ensure the list is heavy on issues and light on recommendations. Finally, ask the outgoing CEO to list what strategic items and enabling matters must be done by the incoming CEO.
Develop a plan for easing out a reluctant CEO. The chair or lead director must have a “personal legacy” discussion with the CEO, and the CEO will inevitably get the message that it’s time to transition, and yet the panel emphasized that this should be a clear—not a nuanced—discussion. Have a plan for how and when the cord will be cut and communicate that plan clearly.
Define how unsuccessful transition candidates will be treated. If these executives can see a good path forward, embrace them. If not, help them leave, and do so quickly.
With a C-suite succession event, corporate strategy is likely to change. The board should endeavor to ensure that a sound corporate culture makes it through the transition.
Ian Bremmer, founder and president of Eurasia Group, is often described as a guru of political risk—a type of risk that’s becoming more important for companies to consider. In his keynote address at the 2016 NACD Global Board Leaders’ Summit, he advised that, although companies have traditionally focused on financial returns, they will need to be primarily concerned about the security of their investments going forward—and investments stand to be radically impacted by geopolitical disruption. Bremmer noted that the impact of significant global changes is much greater than the outcome of the upcoming U.S. elections.
He also pointed out two global developments that companies need to keep top of mind:
1. The increased fragmentation of geopolitical power: Over the past half century, American businesses conflated Americanization with globalization. That line of thinking is failing to hold up, and Americanization of global markets has halted. The United States can no longer set and control the rules of global diplomacy and market place and will be increasingly reluctant to police global tensions. The United States’ transatlantic partnerships are weakening, and the European common market is under threat. These conditions have created an economic power vacuum that China is primed to step up and lead.
A champion of state-owned enterprise and the yuan, China has economic interests that are not aligned with those of the United States. This creates problems for U.S. businesses seeking to conduct business abroad. “Political hedging leads to economic hedging,” Bremmer said. “Corporations that are seen as being aligned with one country will be challenged to commercially succeed in others.” Uber’s failure in China is just one example.
2. The erosion of key social contracts: In recent years, there have been breakdowns in the implicit social contracts between governments and citizens and between companies and consumers. Rising populist anger is challenging the legitimacy of governments and threatening longstanding commitments to free trade. On the economic front, developed countries are spurring economic growth through innovative applications of technology—but these advancements are displacing millions of workers. As a result, Bremmer foresees a rise in nationalistic parties that will challenge the status quo and threaten international commerce, following similar strategies as the Brexit movement the U.K.
But where governments fail to adapt, other parties can step in to make amends—and companies are well positioned to be part of the solution. Bremmer offered the example of AT&T, which faced the possibility of needing to lay off a portion of its workforce because their work no longer supported the company’s future growth. But AT&T also knew that because of the transformations in the telecommunications industry in recent years, these workers would be hard pressed to find employment at another firm. Instead, the company decided to retrain these workers so they could support AT&T’s future trajectory. “If a corporation is the first to say it understands the social contract is breaking down and offers a solution, it will serve them well,” Bremmer said.