Archive for the ‘Investor Relations’ Category

Pay Ratios: A Question of When, Not If

May 4th, 2012 | By

Moving into May and the peak of annual meeting season, executive compensation is one of the top stories in the business media. To date, eight companies have failed their annual say-on-pay votes. With the bulk of annual shareholder meetings in the coming months, this number is expected to increase. This week, an editorial in the New York Times criticized the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) for failing to issue rules on another area of executive compensation—pay ratios—claiming the “main problem seems to be foot-dragging in the face of objections from corporate lobbyists.”

The article correctly identifies several factors. The SEC did delay issuing final rules on the CEO pay ratio until the second half of 2012, effectively postponing corporate disclosure of the ratio of chief executive pay to the company’s median salary until the 2013 proxy season. Also, a substantial number of comment letters have already been submitted to the SEC on matters regarding executive compensation disclosures, including some for which there are no rules pending. Lastly, the rules mandated for pay ratios in Dodd-Frank are unlike most other provisions in the legislation, in that Congress did not allow for much flexibility in crafting the final rules.

However, the NYT editorial did not mention several factors that have hindered progress for the SEC. According to the May 2012 Dodd-Frank Progress Report from Davis Polk, of the SEC’s 95 required rulemakings, the agency has missed the deadline for 56. When final rules are actually released, they are often met with criticism and lawsuits. Last summer the U.S. District Court of Appeals overturned the SEC’s proxy access rule on the basis that the agency had not conducted a thorough cost-benefit analysis. The SEC subsequently introduced a more robust economic analysis in its rulemaking process, leading to a missed deadline for releasing a final rule regarding the conflict minerals provision—which will require companies to track and disclose their use of minerals potentially sourced from the Democratic Republic of the Congo.

With the rigid mandates on the pay-ratio disclosure, the SEC is facing difficulties with one area not clearly defined: computing median compensation. While Dodd-Frank was explicit in the calculation of the ratio, it was not clear in how the median total compensation would be measured. This measurement leads to several questions: Does the compensation of every employee at an organization need to be computed? Should part-time employees be included in the calculation? Would international employees be included? If so, what foreign exchange rate would be used? Taking these questions into consideration, last August the AFL-CIO proposed the use of statistical sampling to calculate the median compensation, an option the SEC is taking seriously.

The argument is no longer whether pay ratio disclosures will have the intended effect of changing executive compensation. Instead, it is when and how these rules will be issued.

Learning From the Past

April 27th, 2012 | By

On April 18th, slightly more than 52% of the FirstMerit shareholders rejected the bank’s say-on-pay proposal. This was the fifth pay plan voted down by shareholders this year. The reason for this rejection is not new: Shareholders claim a misalignment between pay and performance for the senior executives.

FirstMerit stated that the company’s “compensation policies and procedures…are imperative to align the compensation of the company’s named executive officers with [its] business goals and long-term success and that such compensation and incentives are designed to attract, retain and motivate the Company’s key executives.” This statement is identical to the one made in their proxy last year, which received majority shareholder support.

An article in the Wall Street Journal indicated that FirstMerit awarded $6.4 million in total compensation to its CEO in 2011, although its stock trended downward from early 2010 to late 2011. Last year, several companies that lost a say-on-pay vote also faced complaints of a pay for performance disconnect. For example, Jacobs Engineering raised executive compensation nearly 34 percent despite its one- and three-year shareholder returns being below the median of its peer group.

In response to a failed advisory vote, Jacobs Engineering chose to engage directly with shareholders and discuss the rationale for its compensation policies. In 2012, the effort paid off and Jacobs received majority support for its pay plans.

Beazer Homes also approached shareholders after they rejected the 2011 say-on-pay vote. According to the company’s 2012 proxy statement, the compensation committee directed management to “contact several major stockholders in order to better understand the reasons behind the [say-on-pay] vote outcome.” Additionally, the proxy lists the significant changes made to the compensation plan. In February 2012, Beazer Homes reported that the shareholders had overwhelmingly approved the revised compensation plan.

Failing a say-on-pay vote presents a challenge for boards. In some cases, shareholder outreach can provide valuable insights into investor concerns. Over the past year, Jacobs Engineering, Beazer Homes, and others have proved that this type of engagement can succeed.

Buffett Update and Survey Results

March 16th, 2012 | By

Recently, Berkshire Hathaway sent the business world buzzing after announcing that the company’s board had chosen a successor to its legendary CEO, Warren Buffett. In his annual letter to shareholders, Buffett detailed a plan to split his role into three: a CEO, a chairman and several investment managers. The letter also promised a “seamless transition” but did not identify the potential successor or a timeframe. Investor reactions to Berkshire’s announcement have been apprehensive—the labor union AFL-CIO submitted a proposal that would require the company to disclose a succession plan that details the qualities sought for the next CEO and identifies potential internal candidates.

Without any legal requirements or generally accepted best practices in this situation, NACD went to the experts for an opinion—our members. A one-question survey in last Friday’s Directors Daily asked: Do you think the Berkshire board’s choice to not disclose the identity of Buffett’s successor was appropriate? The majority of respondents, 66 percent, agreed with the board’s decision. Several respondents noted the difference between want and need. While the investors and public would like to know the eventual successor to the Oracle of Omaha, Berkshire does not need to disclose.

Other respondents who agreed with the company’s choice noted the issue of time. Unless Buffett plans to retire in the near future, announcing his successor may encourage competing internal candidates to prematurely leave the company. Furthermore, such a disclosure would effectively lock Berkshire to a candidate who—with an undefined timetable—may be unable to take the position at Buffett’s departure. Lastly, several members responded that they simply trusted Buffett’s business acumen.

The remaining third who disagreed with the Berkshire board’s decision largely cited a lack of transparency. By not announcing the successor’s identity, the company creates tension and suspense, which could detract from internal morale. These respondents generally believed that investors were entitled to such transparency—unless Berkshire would be materially damaged by disclosing.